Passwords
Logins, notes, identities, cards, wallets, and developer credentials are encrypted at rest.
Local-first private workspace
Vault works on one computer with no ShellX account or cloud service. Add an encrypted backup file or your own sync server when you want another copy. ShellX Drive is optional.
Logins, notes, identities, cards, wallets, and developer credentials are encrypted at rest.
User-only sealed documents stay out of normal agent listing, search, MCP, and sync surfaces.
Save an encrypted item backup locally, on USB, or inside another provider's synced folder.
An agent can request one exact operation. Vault never returns the raw password through MCP.
Interface map
You can add another encrypted copy later.
No account or server required.
Your HTTPS endpoint and device key.
Current Vault state and active secret surface.
# Contract review
Private working notes stay sealed.
Protected with its own export passphrase.
Drive stores the already-encrypted Vault blob and cannot decrypt it.
This Drive server may read file bodies. These files do not carry Vault protection.
Vault stays fully functional without a ShellX account.
Accidental agent reads, normal indexing, synced-host decryption, and raw MCP secret retrieval. It cannot protect against same-user malware or a program you approve.
Manual · ask before agent writes
Preview every returned change before applying it.
Selected feature
Choose On this computer and create a passphrase. No account or server is required.
First run
Create a passphrase twice. Vault creates the encrypted local store and opens without an account, token, or network service.
For the optional encrypted sync service, enter its HTTPS URL, repository, per-device token, keyfile, and passphrase. The server never receives the master key or plaintext names.
Vault may remember server, token, and wrapped keyfile on this device. It never remembers the passphrase.
A local Vault requires its passphrase. A remote profile also requires its keyfile and device setup. Loss of the required key material is unrecoverable by design.
Passwords and private data
Create a Login or Note, or use typed resources for an identity, payment card, agent wallet, inbox, or developer credential. Password generation is available in the editor.
Copy a username or password without first showing it. Vault attempts to clear the active clipboard after about 30 seconds, but clipboard-history tools may retain a copy.
The item is omitted from agent resource discovery and cannot be used by the MCP request flow.
Non-secret label and field names may be listed. Every MCP process request still waits for owner approval.
The shared broker can permit scoped mediated actions on compatible surfaces. The standalone MCP release still asks before every process launch.
Deletion requires confirmation. Keep a current encrypted backup before removing the only copy of an important credential.
Safe Files
Agents cannot list, read, search, or export Safe Files through Vault, ShellX, MCP, CLI, connectors, or the release Debug API. Moving a decrypted copy outside Safe Files crosses that boundary.
Choose a file, validate its name and content, seal it into the protected store, and record a receipt. Normal agent-visible file indexes remain empty.
Quick view is rendered locally as pixels. Explicit Reveal enables the built-in editor; Save and Discard use short-lived owner handles.
Images, PDFs, Office files, and binaries are metadata-only in this release unless a hardened in-memory renderer is available.
An external app may create plaintext temp files, thumbnails, autosaves, recent-file entries, or cloud copies outside Vault control.
Export creates a decrypted copy outside Safe Files. Vault warns and records the action; protection does not follow the plaintext copy.
Accidental agent reads, normal grep/indexing, sync exposure, and prompt-context ingestion. It does not stop same-user malware, screenshots, OCR, or process-memory inspection.
Approvals
Vault keeps the value out of MCP, model context, and stored results. The child program must receive it to authenticate and can use, retain, or transmit it. Approve only a program or explicit script file you trust.
Sync and backup
| Choice | What it is | Important boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Encrypted backup file | A portable item backup protected by its own export passphrase; save it anywhere. | Backup, not two-way sync. Preview before restore; newer local items are kept. |
| ShellX Drive backup | An optional copy of Vault's already-encrypted store in a sealed Drive workspace. | Drive is a destination, never a requirement for standalone Vault. |
| Plaintext Drive space | A separate file-sync workflow whose server may read file bodies. | Those files do not carry the Vault shield and must not be described as encrypted Vault backup. |
The preview lists added, updated, locally newer, and unchanged items. Restore adds missing items and applies only a backup item newer than the local copy. It never replaces a newer local item with stale backup data.
MCP setup
Use the full path to the installed Vault executable and pass --mcp. Keep Vault open and unlocked when an approval needs to run.
{
"mcpServers": {
"shellx-vault": {
"command": "/full/path/to/ShellX Vault",
"args": ["--mcp"]
}
}
}
Select the installed ShellX Vault.exe under the installation directory and add --mcp.
Use /Applications/ShellX Vault.app/Contents/MacOS/ShellX Vault with --mcp.
Use the installed shellx-vault executable with --mcp.
cargo build --release -p vault-mcp also creates the dedicated shellx-vault-mcp server.
| Tool | Result |
|---|---|
vault_list_resources | Non-secret labels, IDs, kinds, permissions, and field names. |
vault_run_with_secrets | Creates an owner approval request for one exact direct executable. |
vault_request_status | Returns pending, running, completed, failed, denied, cancelled, or expired. |
vault_cancel_request | Cancels the same client's still-pending request. |
There is no raw-secret reveal tool. Inline bash -c, cmd /c, PowerShell command strings, Python -c, and similar evaluation are refused. Use a direct executable or an explicit script file the owner can identify.
Security boundaries
Server-side plaintext disclosure, accidental agent secret retrieval, normal file indexing of Safe Files, stale request approval, standing MCP secret reveal, and obvious loader-environment injection.
A compromised unlocked client, same-user malware, keylogging, screen capture/OCR, process-memory inspection, traffic analysis, or a program the owner approves.
Lock clears owner UI access and preview/editor sessions. It does not terminate a child process you already approved.
Active clipboard clearing is best effort. OS clipboard history, remote clipboard, and third-party clipboard managers can keep old values.
Pending requests expire after five minutes. The queue is capped at 20 and temporarily refuses a sixth pending request from one actor in a minute.
Activity records redacted decisions and results. Exact injected values are removed from captured output before persistence.
Developer tools
Reusable file handoffs with manual, watch, or scheduled policy and explicit agent-write controls.
Explicit project snapshots and return capsules for moving work between machines without live-syncing an active coding directory.
Available only in debug or explicitly enabled builds. It is loopback-only, bearer-protected, and excluded from default release builds.
ShellX can use the same profile and broker as a client. Standalone Vault remains authoritative; ShellX is not required.